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608 BuRGE v. CrrY & CouNTY OF SAN FRANCisco [41 C.2d 
[S. F. No. 18876. In Bank. Oct. 20, 1953.] 
LYNDLE E. BURGE, a Minor, etc., Appellant, v. CITY 
AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, Respondent. 
[1] Judgments - Collateral Attack - Presumptions: Motions-
Orders-Collateral Attack.-Ordinarily when an order or a 
judgment of court of general jurisdiction is collaterally at-
tacked, the only evidence that may be considered in deter-
mining whether order or judgment is void is the record in the 
proceeding in which it was entered, and if the record is silent 
as to existence of a jurisdictional fact, that fact will be pre-
sumed. 
[2] Id.- Collateral Attack- Presumptions.-If a proceeding is 
wholly statutory and unknown to common law the court, even 
though ordinarily one of general jurisdiction, is a court of 
special jurisdiction for that proceeding, and if jurisdictional 
facts do not appear of record in such proceeding, there is no 
presumption of regularity. 
[3] Id.-Proof of Judgments-Extrinsic Evidence.-Where pre-
sumption of regularity of proceedings is not applicable in a 
proceeding which is wholly statutory and unknown to common 
law, the failure of the record to recite a jurisdictional fact 
does not make judgment void, because extrinsic evidence is ad-
missible to prove such fact except where some statute makes 
record the exclusive mode of proof. 
[ 4] Infants-Claims-Compromise or Release.-Without statutory 
authority a parent, as such, cannot compromise or release his 
child's cause of action. 
[5] ld.-Claims-Compromise.-Whether proceedings under Prob. 
Code, § 1431, relating to compromise of a minor's disputed 
claim, are entitled to presumption of regularity need not be 
decided on collateral attack if jurisdictional facts are estab-
lished by extrinsic evidence. 
[6] ld.-Claims-Compromise .. -Under Prob. Code,§ 1431, to estab-
lish right of mother to compromise a minor's disputed claim, 
it must be shown, if father is not dead, that father and mother 
are living separate or apart, that mother has care or custody 
[1] See Cal.Jur., Judgments,§ 150; Motions and Orders, § 26. 
[ 4] Release or compromise by parent of cause of action for in-
juries to child as affecting right of child, note 103 A.L.R. 500. See, 
also, Am.Jur., Parent and Child, § 34. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Judgments, § 297; Motions, § 25; 
[2] Judgments, § 296; [3] Judgments, § 540; [4-10, 12-14, 17-19] 
Infants,§ 2a; [11] Divorce, § 275; [15, 16] Parent and Child, § 5. 
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of minor, that compromise has approval of superior court of 
county where minor resides, and that a verified petition in 
writing seeking approval of compromise has been filed with 
such court. 
[7] Id.-Claims-Compromise.-Although it would ordinarily be 
better practice to hold a hearing on mother's petition for ap-
proval of compromise of minor's disputed claim, the statute 
(Prob. Code, § 1431) does not require it. (Disapproving in-
timation to contrary in Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal.App.2d 652, 
660 [169 P.2d 442].) 
[8] Id.-Claims-Compromise.-Amendment of Prob. Code, § 1431, 
in 1939 so as to provide that claim of minor against third 
person may be compromised by "his father, or if his father 
is dead or the parents of said minor are living separate or 
apart and his mother then has care or custody of said minor 
then his mother," covers not only case of desertion or aban-
donment but any case where father and mother are living 
separate or apart, whether reason therefor be desertion, aban-
donment, agreement of the parties or divorce. 
[9] Id.-Claims-Compromise.-By using word "custody" in 1939 
amendment of Prob. Code, § 1431, the Legislature made it clear 
that if mother and father are living separate or apart, mother 
has authority to compromise a minor's disputed claim if she 
has custody of minor, whether she has that custody by virtue 
of father's abandonment of his family, his inability or refusal 
to take custody, or by virtue of court order awarding her 
custody. 
[10] Id.-Claims-Custody.-An award of joint custody with 
father would not be sufficient to give mother authority to 
compromise a minor's disputed claim. 
[11] Divorce- Custody of Children- To Whom Awarded.-A 
divorce decree that awards parents joint custody of child 
leaves right to custody as it was during marriage when they 
were living together and gives neither a greater right than 
he or she had before divorce. 
[12] Infants-Claims-Compromise.-"Custody" as used in Prob. 
Code, § 1431, relating to compromise of a minor's disputed 
claim by mother when parents are living apart and mother has 
care or custody means complete or exclusive custody. 
[13] Id.-Claims-Compromise.-Addition of words "care or" be-
fore word "custody" in Prob. Code, § 1431, relating to com-
promise of a minor's disputed claim, indicates a clear legisla-
tive purpose not to limit mother's authority to cases in which 
she has custody. 
[14] Id.-Claims-Compromise.-Prob. Code, § 1431, relating to 
compromise of a minor's disputed claim, no more limits "care" 
41 C.2d-20 
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to some cases of care than it limits "custody" to some cases 
of custody; it may not be interpreted as giving either "care" 
or "custody" alternative meanings o:r to make either controlling 
in some eases and not in others. 
[15] Parent and Child-Custody.-Custody embraces sum of pa-
rental rights with respect to the rearing of a child, including 
its care; it includes right to child's services and earnings 
( Civ. Code, § 197) and right to direct his activities and make 
decisions regarding his care and control, education, health 
and religion. 
[16] Id.-Custody.-When parents are living separate or apart 
a court may conclude that best interests of child and due re-
gard for interests of parents require that one or other be given 
complete custody, or it may award "legal custody" to one or 
both parents and "physical custody" to one parent with or 
without right of visitation by other parent, or physical cus-
tody may be awarded to a third person, usually a relative. 
[17] Infants- Claims- Compromise.-In using words "care or 
custody" in Prob. Code, § 1431, relating to compromise of a 
minor's disputed claim, the Legislature by "custody" meant 
complete custody or all rights involved in custody, and by 
"care" meant what has commonly been called "physical cus-
tody" or custodial rights involved in physical care and control 
of child. 
[18] Id.-Claims-Compromise.-If parents are living separate or 
apart and mother has care or physical custody of child, she 
may compromise his claims even though she may or may not 
have his complete custody. 
[19] Id.- Claims- Compromise.-Where parents under divorce 
decree have "joint custody and control" of child but mother 
has "personal custody," award of personal custody gives her 
physical custody and care of child and she therefore has 
authority under Prob. Code, § 1431, to compromise disputed 
claim of child. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the 
City and County of San Francisco. 
Affirmed. 
Superior Court of the 
I. L. Harris, Judge. 
Action for damages for personal injuries. Judgment for 
defendant affirmed. 
John F. O'Sullivan, Millington, Dell'Ergo, Weeks & Mor-
rissey for Appellant. 
Dion R. Holm, City Attorney, and Clayton W. Horn, 
Deputy City Attorney, for Respondent. 
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TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff Lyndle E. Burge, a minor, by his 
father as guardian ad litem, brought this action against de-
fendant city and county of San Francisco to recover dam-
ages for personal injuries suffered by him while he was a 
passenger on a street-railway car operated by defendant. 
Defendant filed an answer pleading as a special defense that 
plaintiff's claim had previously been compromised by his 
mother in a proceeding under section 1431 of the Probate 
Code. The issue so raised was tried separately pursuant to 
section 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The court con-
cluded that the order approving the compromise was not 
subject to collateral attack and entered judgment in favor 
of defendant. Plaintiff appeals. He concedes that the at-
tack is collateral but contends that the court had no juris-
diction to approve the compromise on the grounds that the 
petition for approval of the compromise and the order ap-
proving it were fatally defective in failing to recite jurisdic-
tional facts and that even if these facts could be proved in 
the present proceeding the record therein discloses that his 
mother was without authority to compromise his claim. We 
have concluded that this contention cannot be sustained and 
that the judgment must therefore be affirmed. 
Plaintiff was 14 years old at the time of the accident. His 
father and mother had previously been divorced. The inter-
locutory decree provided that "plaintiff [father] and de-
fendant [mother] have joint custody and control of the said 
minor children, with personal custody in the defendant, and 
the plaintiff has the right and privilege to visit said minor 
children and take them out at all reasonable times." Plain-
tiff was one of the minor children mentioned in the decree 
and lived with his mother after the divorce. 
All negotiations leading to the compromise were conducted 
between plaintiff's mother and defendant. Plaintiff's father 
knew that the accident had occurred and that a claim had 
been filed, but he did not participate in the compromise pro-
ceedings or become aware of the compromise until after it 
had been made. Plaintiff's mother agreed to release his claim 
against defendant upon the payment of $500. She filed with 
the superior court a verified petition seeking approval of the 
compromise, and it was approved. Defendant paid the $500 
and plaintiff's mother executed a release. The present action 
was brought before plaintiff reached majority. 
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The verified petition1 and the order approving the com-
promise2 are set forth in the footnotes. Plaintiff contends 
at the outset that the court failed to approve the compromise, 
on the grounds that the order recites that it approved a ''dis-
puted claim for minor that Iva Burge has against" defend-
ant and that such a claim is not the claim of plaintiff against 
defendant. There is nothing to show that there was any 
need for a judicial proceeding to approve a compromise of 
any claim of her own that plaintiff's mother may have had 
against defendant. The proceeding was entitled '' Applica-
tion of Iva Burge for an order approving the compromise of 
disputed claim entered by a minor, Lyndle Burge.'' The veri-
fied petition recited that it was the compromise of the minor's 
claim for which approval was sought, and the order recited 
that it was upon the reading and filing of that petition that 
it appeared to the court that the compromise offer was· rea-
sonable. Although the order made a slipshod description 
of the claim that was being compromised, when it is read with 
the petition, there can be no doubt that the court approved 
a compromise of plaintiff's claim against defendant. 
It is plaintiff's principal contention that the court lacked 
jurisdiction to compromise his claim. [1] Ordinarily when 
an order or a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction is 
collaterally attacked, the only evidence that may be considered 
1"The petition of IvA BuRGE respectfully shows: (1) That petitioner 
is the mother of LYNDLE BURGE, a minor, age fourteen, and that both 
petitioner and the minor are residents of the City and County of San 
Francisco. 
"(2) That minor had disputed claim for money against the City and 
County of San Francisco for injuries sustained by minor when an acci-
dent occurred on August 29, 1945, at Duboce and Fillmore Streets in-
volving a collision of Streetcars 'N' and #22, operated by the City and 
County of San Francisco. 
"(3) That said City and County of San Francisco offered to pay in 
compromise of said claim the sum of FIVE HUNDRED ($500.00) DoLLARS, 
which, in the opinion of petitioner is a reasonable compromise, and that 
it will be in the best interests of said minor if said compromise is 
accepted by this Court. 
''WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that the Court approve said compromise 





" Upon reading and filing the verified petition of IVA BURGE for an 
order approving compTomise of the disputed claim for minor that IvA 
BuRGE has against the City and County of San Francisco, and it ap-
pearing to the Court that the compromise offer is reasonable, 
''IT Is HEREBY ORDERED that said compromise be and it is hereby 
approved, and that the saicl City and County of San Francisco, is hereby 
directed to pay the sum of FIVE HUNDRED ($500.00) DOLLARS to IVA 
BuRGE, a minor, without the filing of any bond.'' 
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in determining whether the order or judgment is void is the 
record in the proceeding in which it was entered. If the 
record is silent as to the existence of a jurisdictional fact, 
that fact will be presumed. ( Gtwrdianship of Hall, 31 Cal.2d 
157, 164 (187 P.2d 396]; Wells Fargo&; Co. v. City of San 
Francisco, 25 Cal.2d 37, 40 (152 P.2d 625] ; cf. Thompson 
v. Cook, 20 Cal.2d 564, 569, 573 [127 P.2d 909] .) [2] It has 
been held, however, that if a proceeding is wholly statutory 
and unknown to the common law, the court, even though ordi-
narily one of general jurisdiction, is a court of special juris-
diction for that proceeding, and if jurisdictional facts do 
not appear of record in such a proceeding, there is no pre-
sumption of regularity. (Estate of Sharon, 179 Cal. 447, 
457-458 [177 P. 283]; 49 C.J.S., ,Judgments, p. 840; cf. Es-
tate of Kay, 30 Cal.2d 215, 220-221 [181 P.2d 1].) [3] If 
the presumption is not applicable, however, failure of the 
record in such a proceeding to recite a jurisdictional fact 
''does not make the judgment void, for extrinsic evidence is 
admissible to prove such fact, except where some statute makes 
the record the exclusive mode of proof." (Estate of Sharon, 
supra, 179 Cal. at p. 458.) 
[4] It is the general rule that without statutory authority 
a parent, as such, cannot compromise or release his child's 
cause of action. (See 103 A.L.R. 500; 39 Am.Jur. 629.) 
[5] It has been held, however, that proceedings under section 
1431 are entitled to the presumption of regularity. (Rico 
v. Nasser Bros. Realty Co., 58 Cal.App.2d 878, 882 (137 P.2d 
861].) Plaintiff, relying on the Sharon case, supra, contends 
that the Rico case was erroneously decided. Defendant, on 
the other hand, contends that the Hall and Wells Fargo cases, 
supra, are controlling. It is unnecessary, however, to resolve 
these contentions if the jurisdictional facts are established by 
the extrinsic evidence. 
[6] Under section 1431, to establish the right of the mother 
to compromise a minor's disputed claim, it must be shown, 
if the father is not dead, that (1) the father and mother are 
living separate or apart; (2) the mother has the care or cus-
tody of the minor; (3) the compromise has the approval of 
the superior court of the county where the minor resides; 
and ( 4) a verified petition in writing seeking approval of the 
compromise has been filed with such court. 
Plaintiff contends that a hearing on the petition is also 
required. Plaintiff and his mother testified in the present 
proceeding that neither was present in court when the order 
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approving the compromise was made and that no testimony 
was taken relating to the extent of his injuries or the fairness 
of the compromise. The trial court granted defendant's mo-
tion to strike this testimony. No error appears. [7] Al-
though it would ordinarily be better practice3 to hold a hear-
ing and take testimony, the statute does not require it. (Rico 
v. Nasser Bros. Realty Co., supra, 58 Cal.App.2d 878, 881.) 
Plaintiff relies on Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal.App.2d 652 [169 
P.2d 442], for a contrary rule. There, however, the proceed-
ing was under section 196a of the Civil Code. The court 
was careful to point out that even if section 1431 were deemed 
to apply to actions by a child under section 196a (see 2 Arm-
strong, California Family Law, p. 1084), no attempt had been 
made to compromise the child's claim thereunder, since the 
parent had never filed a verified claim for approval of the 
compromise as required by section 1431. (74 Cal.App.2d at 
p. 660.) Insofar as the court intimated that a hearing would 
be necessary had the proceeding been under section 1431, 
the statement was unnecessary .to the decision in the case 
and is contrary to Rico v. Nasser Bros. Realty Co., S~[pra. 
The verified petition and the order approving the com-
promise disclose that requirements ( 3) and ( 4) above were 
met, but do not disclose that (1) the father and mother were 
living separate or apart or that (2) the mother had the care 
or custody of plaintiff. Extrinsic evidence, however, estab-
lished that the father and mother were divorced and were 
living apart at the time of the compromise. The controlling 
question that remains, therefore, is whether it was also proved 
that the mother then had the "care or custody" of plain-
tiff. To answer that question we must first determine what 
the Legislature meant by the terms "care or custody." 
Until 1939, section 1431 of the Probate Code provided that 
a disputed claim of a minor could be compromised by his 
mother only if "his father is dead or has deserted or aban-
"Rule 28(c) of the Superior Court Rules (33 Cal.2d 14, effective Janu-
ary 1, 1949, whieh was after the compromise in this case) provides: 
"Upon the hearing of the petition, the person compromising the claim on 
behalf of the minor or incompetent and the minor or incompetent shall 
be in attendance unless for good cause the court dispenses with such 
personal appearance. The court may require the presence and testimony 
of the attending <'>r examining physician, as well as other evidence relating 
to the merits of the claim, the nature and extent of the injury, care, 
treatment and hospitalization.'' Attendance of the parties and the 
taking of evidence is even today not mandatory and a compromise can 
still be effected without such testimony and attendance, if, in the dis-
cretion of the trial judge, good cause is shown. As to the taking of 
testimony, the word "may" is of course permissive. 
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do ned him." It was held that under this wording of the 
section the mother could not compromise a claim when the 
parents were divorced, even though the mother had been 
awarded custody o£ the minor. (In re Parrino (1937), 24 
CaL A pp.2d 128 [ 7 4 P .2d 549] . ) The decision in the Parrino 
case prompted the Legislature in 1939 to reexamine section 
1431 of the Probate Code. It amended the section to provide 
that a claim of a minor against a third person may be com-
promised by "his rather, or if his father is dead or the 
parents of said minor are living separate or apart and his 
mother then has care or custody of said minor then his 
mother."4 The amendment not only met the situation of the 
Parrino case but extended the mother's authority in other 
respects. The Parrino case problem could have been met by 
simply adding to the old phrase the words "or for other 
reasons5 the mother has custody of him.'' Instead, the 
Legislature substituted a complete new phrase. [8] The 
broad language of the new phrase covers not only a mise of 
desertion or abandonment but any case where the father and 
mother are living separate or apart,6 whether the reason 
therefor be desertion, abandonment, agreement of the parties 
or divorce. [9] Furthermore, by using the word ''custody'' 
the Legislature made it clear that if the mother and father 
are living separate or apart, the mother has authority to 
compromise if she has custody of the minor, whether she has 
that custody by virtue of the father's abandonment of his 
family, his inability or refusal to take custody, or by virtue 
of a court order awarding her custody. 
[10] An award of joint custody with the father would not, 
however, be sufficient to give the mother authority to com-
promise. Even though living apart, the parents are both en-
titled to custody unless one is unable or refuses to take 
custody or has abandoned his or her family ( Civ. Code, § 197), 
or unless the sole custody of the child has been awarded to 
4A similar amendment was made in 1939 to section 376 of the Code 
of Civil Procedure, but was removed in 1949. (Of. Espinosa v. Haslam 
(1935), 8 Cal.App.2d 213 [ 47 P.2d 479].) 
5 Under section 197 of the Civil Code, the mother is entitled to custody 
if the father is dead or has abandoned his family, or is unable or refuses 
to take custody. 
"This language was probably suggested by Civil Code, section 198, 
which provides: ''The husband and father, as such, has no right superior 
to those of the wife and mother, in regard to the care, custody, education, 
and control of the children of the marriage, while such husband and wife 
live separate and apart from each other.'' 
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one of them. (Watkins v. Clemmer, 129 Cal.App. 567, 574 
[19 P.2d 303].) [11] A divorce decree that awards the 
parents joint custody leaves the right to custody as it was 
during the marriage when they were living together and gives 
neither a greater right than he or she had before the divorce. 
[12] Custody as used in section 1431 therefore means com-
plete or exclusive custody. 
[13] Had the Legislature used only the word ''custody'' 
instead of the words ''care or custody'' there could be no 
doubt that it meant to limit the mother's authority to com-
promise to cases in which she has custody. Had it meant to 
make both care and custody a condition to the mother's au-
thority to compromise it would have used the word ''and'' 
instead of the word "or. " 7 The addition of the words "care 
or" seems therefore to indicate a clear legislative purpose 
not to limit the mother's authority to cases in which she has 
custody. 
It has been suggested that the words "care or" were added 
to the statute only for cases in which custody has not already 
been adjudicated, to relieve the court, because of the difficult 
factual and legal questions that may be involved, of the neces-
sity of having to determine whether or not the mother has 
custody of the minor. In such cases it is necessary to estab-
lish only that the mother has care of the minor, but if the 
custody has already been adjudicated, and the mother has 
not been awarded custody, she has no authority to compro-
mise, even though she has the care of the minor. Under 
this interpretation, even if the father has not abandoned his 
family and is able and willing to take custody and the mother 
does not therefore have custody, she may nevertheless com-
promise if she has the care of the minor. If the reason she 
does not have custody, however, is a previous adjudication 
of custody, she cannot compromise even though she has the 
care of the minor. Thus in some cases ''care'' would be con-
trolling, and it would be immaterial that the mother did not 
have custody of the minor. In other cases "custody" would 
be controlling, and it would be immaterial that the mother 
had ''care'' of the minor. 
7 The legislative history of Assembly Bill No. 1082, amending section 
1431 in 1939, indicates that the statute was deliberately written in the 
disjunctive. As introduced, the bill provided that the mother could com-
promise a claim of a minor ''if his father is dead or the parents of said 
child are living separate and apart and his mother then has custody.'' 
'l'he bill as finally passed provided, ''if his father is dead or the parents 
of said minor are living separate or apart and his mother than has 
care or custody." (Changes indicated by italics.) 
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[14] The statute, however, no more admits of limiting 
''care'' to some cases of care than it does of limiting '' cus-
tody" to some cases of custody. The child may actually be 
taken care of in an institution or by a stranger or relative and 
yet the mother may have custody of it, including the right to 
its care, by virtue of the father's abandonment of his family 
or his inability or refusal to take custody. In such a case 
the mother would have the right to compromise, since the Leg-
iRlature did not limit "custody" to custody derived from a 
court order. There is nothing in the statute to indicate that 
"(mstody" has a double meaning, that in cases in which it is 
necessary to establish custody before a compromise can be 
approved it is to be interpreted as meaning custody however 
derived, but for the purpose of rendering "care or" mean-
ingless, it is to be interpreted as meaning custody derived 
from a court order when there is such an order. Had the 
Legislature meant to give either "care" or "custody" alter-
native meanings or to make either controlling in some cases 
and not in others, it would have said so. It placed these words 
in the statute unmodified by other words that would suggest 
that they were not of equal force or were not to be applied 
in the disjunctive in all cases. We are not at liberty to re-
strict and expand at will the application of these words or 
to seek hidden meanings in them to accomplish a purpose that 
does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legis-
lative history. 
Plaintiff contends that "care or custody" mean the same 
thing and that the Legislature therefore did not give the 
mother authority to compromise a minor's claim in cases in 
which she does not have custody. The words "care or," how-
ever, were deliberately added, and cannot be regarded as super-
fluous, if a reasonable construction thereof will give effect to 
them and preserve all the other words of the statute. 
[15] Custody embraces the sum of parental rights with 
respect to the rearing of a child, including its care. It in-
cludes the right to the child's services and earnings ( Civ. 
Code, § 197) and the right to direct his activities and make 
decisions regarding his care and control, education, health. 
and religion. (Lerner v. Superior Co?trt, 38 Cal.2d G7G, 681 
[242 P.2d 321] ; see 2 Armstrong, California :B'amily Law, 
p. 954.) These rights are exercised by both parents in an 
undivided home ( Civ. Code, § 197) and differences between 
them are ordinarily resolved at home without the necessity 
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of invoking the aid of a court. [16] When the parents are 
living separate or apart, however, there are apt to be not 
only frequent differences of opinion with respect to any of 
the matters involved in custody, but frequent resort to courts 
for their settlement. In such cases a court may conclude 
that the best interests of the child and due regard for the 
interests of the parents require that one or the other be 
given complete custody of the child. It may conclude that 
such action would be unjust, and unable like Solomon to 
carve the child, it may carve out of the sum of custodial 
rights, certain rights to be exercised by each parent. Thus 
it is common practice in divorce cases for the court to award 
''legal custody'' to one or both parents and ''physical cus-
tody" to one parent with or without the right of visitation 
by the other parent, or physical custody may even be awarded 
to a third person, usually a relative. Decisions made in the 
exercise of the rights awarded are not necessarily final, for 
the court's orders are subject to modification. ( Civ. Code, 
§ 138; Cooney v. Cooney, 25 Cal.2d 202, 205 [153 P.2d 334], 
and cases cited.) 
[17] We believe the Legislature had this practice in mind 
when it used the words "care or custody." By "custody," 
it meant complete custody or all the rights involved in cus-
tody. By "care" it meant what has commonly been called 
"physical custody" or the custodial rights involved in the 
physical care and control of the child. The Legislature was 
alsq aware that in many cases fathers and mothers may be 
living apart where there have been no divorce or other pro-
ceedings adjudicating the right to custody. It may be un-
known where the father is or uncertain whether or not he 
has forfeited his rights to custody. (See 2 Armstrong, Cali-
fornia Family Law, p. 1006 et seq.) In such cases, if the 
mother has the care of the child, it is not necessary that there 
also be a judicial determination that she has his complete 
custody. [18] Thus, if the parents are living separate or 
apart, and the mother has the care or physical custody of the 
child, she may compromise his claims even though she may or 
may not also have his complete custody. 
[19] In the present case, the parents were living apart 
and the child lived with his mother. Under the divorce de-
cree the parents had "joint custody and control" but the 
mother had "personal custody." There can be no doubt that 
the award of personal custody gave her the physical custody 
and care of the child. Having the care of the child, she had 
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authority under section 1431 of the Probate Code to com-
promise the claim in question. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
CARTER, J.-I dissent. 
At the time this matter arose, section 1431 of the Probate 
Code provided, in part, that when a minor has a disputed 
claim for damages "his father, or if his father is dead or 
the parents of said minor are living separate or apart and 
his mother then has care or custody of said minor then his 
mother, shall have the right to compromise, or execute a 
covenant not to sue .... " (Emphasis added.) 
Although it did not appear in the mother's petition for 
approval of the settlement of the minor's claim, or in the 
court's order of approval, that the father was dead, or that 
the child's parents were living separate or apart, or that she 
had the care or custody of the child, extrinsic evidence 
showed that the parents were divorced and that by court 
decree, they were given joint legal custody with "personal" 
custody in the mother. 
A majority of this court has determined that the words 
"care or custody" were intended by the Legislature to give 
the mother authority to compromise a disputed claim if she 
had the care of the child whether or not she had custody of 
him. ''The addition of the words 'care or' seems therefore 
to indicate a clear legislative purpose not to limit the mother's 
authority to cases in which she has custody." This holding, 
of course, makes a nullity of the court order awarding joint 
custody to both parents with physical, or personal, custody 
in one of them. \Vith separated, or divorced, parents, it is 
impossible for both to have personal custody of the child-
one must have it since, as pointed out in the majority opinion, 
the court cannot "like Solomon ... carve the child." We 
have held (Lerner v. Superior Court, 38 Cal.2d 676 [242 P.2d 
321] ) that custody includes the right to direct the child's 
activities and make decisions regarding his care, control, 
education, health and religion. The father here, by court 
order, had the rights above enumerated but a majority of 
this court interprets the statute so as to deprive him of a voice 
in making a major decision having to do with the child's 
future welfare, education and health. The majority concedes, 
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as indeed it must, that an award of joint custody with the 
father would not be sufficient to give the mother authority 
to compromise and yet it is held that because the mother had 
the person of the child in her care, she did have the authority. 
As I have heretofore pointed out, when parents are living 
separate and apart, the person of the child must be with one 
or the other but the decree giving them joint custody gives 
neither a greater right to control than either had before the 
divorce. 
I am of the opinion that the use of the words ''care or 
custody" by the Legislature was intended to take care of the 
situation where there was no court order giving custody to 
one, or both, parents or where the mother had the care of 
the child because the father had abandoned or deserted his 
family and his whereabouts were unknown. Under the in-
terpretation of the majority, the mother, having physical 
custody and care of the child, could compromise a claim for 
him even though sole legal custody had been awarded to 
the father or even if she had the care of the child for a week, 
or a week end, with sole custody in the father. For example, 
it is said "If the reason she does not have custody, how-
ever, is a previous adjudication of custody, she cannot com-
promise even though she has the care of the minor. Thus 
in some cases 'care' would be controlling, and it would be 
immaterial that the mother did not have custody of the 
minor. In other cases 'custody' would be controlling, and 
it would be immaterial that the mother had 'care' of the 
minor." It appears to me that if there has been no formal 
adjudication of custody, and one parent has the care of the 
minor, because the other has abandoned it, that is a matter 
easily established in the petition for approval; or, on the other 
hand, if custody has been formally adjudicated, that matter 
also may be established. If one parent had legal custody, 
and the other had the temporary care of the child, the one 
having temporary care would hardly be the one authorized to 
compromise a claim which might have a far-reaching effect 
on the child's future. It is said that under this interpretation, 
if the parents are separated even if the father has not aban-
doned the child, and is ready and able to take custody but 
custody has not been adjudicated to the mother, she having the 
care of the child, may compromise his claim. Since the matter 
of the parents living separate and apart .~hou-ld appear in the 
petition for approval (Pro b. Code, § 1431), the court could, 
before approving the settlement, require the father's consent 
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thereto since neither parent has a greater right than the other. 
The words ''care'' and ''custody'' were used in the dis-
junctive to take care of two different situations and to inter-
pret them as I think they should be interpreted would give 
effect to both words and would not make a nullity out of a 
court order awarding custody to one, or both, parents. As the 
majority interprets them, the word "custody" means nothing 
if the mother has the "care" of the minor. 
Since it seems clear to me that the mother had no authority 
to compromise the claim of the minor, I would reverse the 
judgment. 
[Crim. No. 5483. In Bank. Oct. 20, 1953.] 
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